The history of colonial America has long been viewed as having been shaped primarily by commercial and ideological interests. Accounts of the period have focused on such factors as the profit-making origins of colonial Virginia, the religious interests of the Puritans settling Massachusetts, and the trading disputes and rhetoric of liberty that drove the colonies to rebel. These elements are rooted in the contemporary sources and reflect the concerns of the men and women who defined many of the events in the colonies. Yet they only tell part of the story. What has been left out, according to Stephen Saunders Webb, is the military dimension of English imperial government. His ambitious book, the first of a multi-volume series about the governance of the English empire in the early modern era, attempts to redefine our understanding of how the English empire was ruled by focusing on the governors of the English colonies, arguing that their martial backgrounds and autocratic approach to their responsibilities played an underappreciated role in the development of the English empire in the 17^th century.

To make his case, Webb, divides his analysis into three parts. The first traces the origins of an authoritarian approach to civil power in England during the late 16^th and early 17^th centuries. Starting with the martial response to the threats of rebellion and invasion during that era, Webb describes how garrison commanders such as George Carey in the Isle of Wight exerted their authority over the communities in their area in ways that defied English traditions of local rule. This Webb sees as a new model for English governance that many of the army officers who exercised such responsibilities brought with them when they were appointed to military and civil posts throughout the empire. Singling out the colonies of Jamaica and Virginia, he shows how during key moments in each colony’s development – during the post-conquest period in Jamaica and in the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia – these officials asserted authority on behalf of the crown in a way that bolstered imperial power at the expense of the colonial elites, establishing a pattern of imperial administration that would endure until the period of “salutary neglect” that began in the 1720s provided colonists with the opportunity to reassert the “habit” of local control.

Webb’s book offers a bold challenge to the traditional understanding of how the English governed their empire, and he identifies some important elements of English rule that have been neglected for far too long by people who read history backwards in anticipation of the struggle for independence in the 1760s and 1770s. Yet for all of his considerable research and the forcefulness with which he states his conclusions, Webb’s analysis is hobbled by several flaws which undermine his case in a number of respects. Foremost among them is the exaggerated distinction he makes between the officer-administrators at the center of his book and the civilian governors with whom he contrasts them, both of whom typically had the same origins in the English landed gentry. Moreover, his examples of “garrison government” in the British isles were the exception rather than the norm, and were far from unique, having been predated by similar establishments in places such as Scotland, Ireland, and Calais. Though these precursors demonstrate the prevalence of the tradition of quasi-military government in English history, their locations at the fringes of English authority demonstrate the unusual conditions necessary for such rule, which often did not exist in the colonies and were absent from England itself once royal authority was restored in 1660.

Nor are Webb’s flaws limited to his coverage of events in England. While the violent circumstances of the English Civil War created a generation of officers experienced with authoritarian rule, too often Webb assumes that all of the men of military experience were dedicated to its implementation in the colonies, when in fact many of them were often focused on more personal concerns and preferred to compromise with colonial legislatures rather than engage in acrimonious assertions of royal power. Webb’s description of events in Virginia in particular is almost frustratingly context-free, as he alludes to Bacon’s Rebellion without ever really describing it, and leaving out much of the relevant pre-rebellion history of the colony unaddressed. This downplays the deep roots of the power possessed by the colonial elites, who as even Webb acknowledges were often able to check the garrisoning tendencies of governors like Thomas Culpepper.

Such nuance would have make for a more complicated tale but a less forceful argument. This is the hidden strength of Webb’s book, which for all its flaws serves as an important corrective to the traditionally commercialist focus of studies of English colonialism. Whether Webb addresses these issues in his later volumes remains to be seen, but even with its limitations it remains an important book for understanding the history of government in colonial America.

By nearly every measure, the sixteenth century bore witness to a remarkable number of extraordinary monarchs.  Rulers such as Henry VIII and Elizabeth I of England, Francis I of France, the Habsburg emperors Charles V and Philip II, Ivan IV of Russia, ‘Abbas I of Persia, and the Mughal emperor Akbar reshaped their realms through their ambitious policies and forceful rule.  Yet even in this august group the name of Suleiman stands out.  As sultan of the Ottomans, Suleiman led the empire during what is generally regarded as the pinnacle of its glory and power.  Under his rule the empire flourished and extended its control over three continents.  Yet in spite of this Suleiman has received far less attention form biographers than most of his contemporaries, present more often as an opponent or an ally in many accounts than as a figure worth of attention in his own right.

Given this, Andre Clot’s biography of the sultan is to be welcomed.  A longtime journalist, Clot divides his book into two parts.  The first is a straightforward narrative of Suleiman’s life that addresses on the political and military aspects of his reign.  This section focuses heavily on Suleiman’s interactions with Christian Europe, even to the point of having an entire chapter addressing the sultan’s relations with Francis I.  The second part of the book is an examination of the Ottoman empire during Suleiman’s reign, one that describes the economy, urban life, and culture that existed during his reign.  Though the two sections compliment each other, each part stands alone to the point of being able to be read separate from the other, a lack of integration that ultimately weakens the effort to present a rounded overall picture of Suleiman and his times.

In the end, the focus and structure of the book prevent it from achieving Clot’s stated goal of providing a fuller understanding of Suleiman and his empire.  The Eurocentrism of Clot’s narrative slights the considerable campaigns Suleiman conducted on his eastern borders against the Safavids, to say nothing of his considerable contributions to the empire’s internal development in such areas as the law.  Mixing the two sections might have counterbalanced this, but their separation inhibits an easy understanding of his role and impact within the broader empire.  These problems limit the usefulness of Clot’s book, which is recommended for anyone seeking to learn about the sultan only because of the disappointing lack of anything better.

The overthrow of King James II during the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 is one of the key events of not just English history but Irish history as well.  As king, James had pursued a policy of “Catholicization” in Ireland, allowing Catholics to serve in the army and the government, which fueled anxieties among the Protestant population.  When news reached them of the dramatic events in England, the Protestants began defying the Catholic authorities, who responded to what soon became an uprising against Catholic rule.  The result was three of the bloodiest and most destructive years in Irish history, as the island served as the battlefield on which broader struggles were waged.  This war is the subject of John Childs’s book, which details the campaigns from the initial unrest to the conclusion of the conflict.

Childs traces the success of the rebellion to the two-week period in 1688 when Derry was without a garrison, arguing that had the town been continuously occupied and the Protestants there suppressed the rebellion could not have prospered.  Yet even with Derry the Protestants faced a difficult first year, as the more numerous Catholic forces gradually asserted control throughout the island.  By the summer, only Derry and Enniskillen remained as Protestant holdouts, yet the arrival of forces under the command of the Duke of Schomberg managed to secure most of Ulster before the end of the campaigning season.  The new year saw an increased commitment of forces against the Catholics, one led by King William III himself.  With William’s army pressing down from the north, the two sides clashed at the Battle of the Boyne, which broke James’s fragile resolve.  His flight left his supporters with no other option than an attrition campaign that could buy them time in the hope that William might suffer defeats elsewhere that would salvage the situation for them.

Childs recounts the conflict in considerable detail, carefully tracing the numerous skirmishes that characterized the “war of posts and ambuscades”.  This results in a dense text, one that makes it challenging to follow the sequence of events.  Making matters worse are the inadequate maps provided, which provide only basic geographic details, rendering them less than helpful in following the various battles and campaigns.  Better maps and subheadings within the chapters would have gone far into providing a more accessible history of the war than the one Childs has written, in which the value of his examination of the conflict is offset by its inaccessibility.

For the past several decades, readers seeking an introduction to the Ottoman empire have turned to Halil Inalcik’s seminal book The Ottoman Empire; The Classical Age.  Written by the dean of Ottoman history, it provided an overview of its history and an examination of its components that has stood the test of time.  Over the three and a half decades since its publication, however, a wealth of new scholarship has emerged that has refined and developed our knowledge.  The fruits of this can be seen in Colin Imber’s study, one that treads much of the same ground as Inalcik but does so with the benefit of an additional generation of study.

The layout of Imber’s book is similar to that of Inalcik’s (which Imber helped translate); an initial section chronicling the political and military history of the period followed by chapters providing an analytical overview of various aspects of the empire.  But whereas Inalcik’s book provided a broad‑ranging survey that included its cultural and religious elements, Imber focuses more narrowly on the institutions of state: the palace, the bureaucracy, and the military.  This allows him to provide a more detailed examination of the military state, one that describes its development and shows how it both conquered and governed the lands of three continents.

Clearly written and well grounded in the literature of the field, Imber’s book is a detailed and up-to-date account of the factors underpinning Ottoman power in the first centuries of its existence.  Anyone seeking an introduction to the Ottoman empire would do well to start with it.  With its concentration on imperial institutions and its closer examination of such things as the Ottoman navy (which has received far more scholarly attention in recent decades than it had when Inalcik wrote his book), it complements rather than replaces Inalcik’s longstanding survey, providing readers with a good foundation for exploring in more detail the last and greatest of the Muslim empires.