Truth and Other Enigmas
Frege held that truth and falsity are the references of sentences. Sentences cannot stand for propositions (what Frege calls 'thoughts'), since the reference of a complex expression depends only on the reference of its parts; whereas if we substitute for a singular term occurring in a sentence...
show more
Frege held that truth and falsity are the references of sentences. Sentences cannot stand for propositions (what Frege calls 'thoughts'), since the reference of a complex expression depends only on the reference of its parts; whereas if we substitute for a singular term occurring in a sentence another singular term with the same reference but a different sense, the sense of the whole sentence, i.e. the thought which it expresses, changes.
show less
Format: paperback
ISBN:
9780674910768 (0674910761)
Publish date: January 1st 1978
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Pages no: 528
Edition language: English