The greatest naval conflict in history broke out almost seventy years ago. Richard Hough presents here a reassessment of what happened and why.

It is a history as much of men as of ships: the admirals of the Grand Fleet and their Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Jellicoe; and the men at the Admiralty, among them the reformer, inspirer, and charmer, 'Jacky' Fisher, and Winston Churchill--arrogant, opinionated, but prodigiously hard working--who between them succeeded in dragging the Royal Navy out of its serenely complacent nineteenth-century condition and preparing it for its first great campaign for more than a hundred years.

Richard Hough describes the years leading up to 1914, the Kaiser's burning resentment of Britain's unchallenged supremacy at sea, and the headlong race to war, accelerated by the construction of the Dreadnought, the biggest, fastest, and most heavily gunned battleship in the world. During the course of the war there were shocks and disappointments for both sides. The Royal Navy found itself dogged by a lack of secure bases, over-rigid battle orders, uncoordinated planning, and poor signalling. Operations, from the North Sea to the South Atlantic, were carried out against a background of feuds, scheming, and personality clashes at the Admiralty.

Was there 'something wrong with our bloody ships', to echo David Beatty at Jutland? Could the appalling losses been avoided during the Dardanelles campaign? why were crucial signals received at the Admiralty filed instead of being acted upon? The Battle of Jutland was the greatest naval battle of the war, but also the greatest disappointment: who was really to blame for the inconclusive outcome?

But despite the losses and the mistakes, the brilliance and courage of many men shine through: the invaluable decoding work of 'Room 40'; the resilience of the commanders; the unfailing bravery and high morale of the men on the lower decks; and the excellent relationship between the British and American navies towards the end of the war.

It is Richard Hough's contention that the Royal Navy not only beat the Kriegsmarine without resort to a bloody Trafalgar, but that its unrelenting pressure was the prime factor which led to the defeat on land of the Central Powers by the end of 1918. This account shows how that victory was achieved between 4 August 1914 and the abject surrender of the High Seas Fleet over four years later.